On Josh Byrnes

I'm actually ridiculously optimistic about the upcoming Diamondbacks season. Now, granted, I've been ridiculously optimistic the last two years, and not had a whole lot to show for it, but this season feels different somehow. Like any fan worth his salt, I've managed to convince myself of a whole list of reasons why this season will be so much better than the 92-loss abortion that preceded it. I will post that list at some point before the season, but that's a topic for another day. What I really want to focus on is what this season will mean for Josh Byrnes, the general manager of the Diamondbacks.

The other day, I was chatting with a friend of mine about the Diamondbacks. When the subject of the Diamondbacks' management came up, my friend, who is also from Phoenix and who is quite knowledgeable about baseball, exclaimed, "I fuckin' hate Josh Byrnes!" I was a bit taken aback by this reaction. I mean, I like Josh Byrnes, and I legitimately think he is incredibly intelligent and competent when it comes to running a baseball team. Furthermore, of all the moves he made since taking over the Diamondbacks in 2005, there is only one that I really found fault with at the time it was made.*

*That one move was the Max Scherzer trade made this offseason. Upon reading about this trade, I threw a readily-available book at the wall, and sulked for the rest of the day. A few days later, I began to come around on the trade, and I determined that the trade might not be catastrophic for the team. A few days after that, I decided that Josh Byrnes was a genius for getting two starting pitchers for the price of one. For more information, re-read the opening paragraph about lies that deluded fans tell themselves.

The team that Josh Byrnes inherited in 2005 was a nondescript mishmash of aging veterans and free agents from other teams, signed to mask the team's lack of depth at critical positions. This team had only three starting position players under the age of 28, and any prospects in the minors were at least a year away. The team was also poor, as their splurge of free agent signings inflated their payroll, and would cost them dearly for seasons to come. In short, they were bad, they were uninteresting to watch, and they had little potential to get better in the near future.

Despite these problems, however, Josh Byrnes had a plan, which he set about unfolding in 2006. He began to jettison the entrenched veterans in favor of younger, cheaper rookies like Stephen Drew and Carlos Quentin--rookies that Byrnes believed would provide the backbone of the Diamondbacks' lineup for years to come. He simultaneously signed and traded for cheap veterans (Eric Byrnes and Orlando Hudson), who would supplement the young core. All of his moves seemed, at least to my young eyes, highly methodical and sustainable. Based on everything I knew about sports, this seemed to be the "proper" way to rebuild a team. Byrnes' method was rewarded in 2007, when his young team won 90 games and made it to the NLCS.* The plan seemed to be working: the Diamondbacks were clearly a team on the rise.

*These 2007 Diamondbacks have a very legitimate argument for being the worst 90-win team in baseball history. Not only did they have a Pythagorean win-loss record of 79-83, by virtue of being outscored in the regular season, but their numbers were buoyed by a number of fluke individual performances. The highest WAR (wins above replacement) on the team belonged to Eric Byrnes, who turned in a four-win season from out of nowhere. Previously unknown Micah Owings provided a 110 ERA+. And so on...

Then, regression caught up. Many of Byrnes' patented young stars, who seemed so promising in the minors, stagnated in the majors and cast doubt on their ability. The once-strong farm system was gutted through trades for players (Dan Haren and Adam Dunn) who would put the team over the top. They finished out of the playoffs in 2008, and suffered through a nightmarish season of injuries and bad luck in 2009.

Along the way, Josh Byrnes' style changed along with his team's fortunes. Where he had once been meticulous about acquiring young talent and cheap veterans, his moves this offseason show a distinct desire to "win now." He traded Max Scherzer, under team control for 5 years, for Edwin Jackson, under team control for 2 years. His signings of Kelly Johnson and Adam LaRoche both fill holes, but they reduce playing time for talented young rookies Tony Abreu and Brandon Allen.

Byrnes clearly knows that he is on the hot seat. Even if he doesn't get fired after the season, another season like last year will likely result in a massive overhaul of the team that he constructed. The team has fewer holes than it did at this point last season, and should be better simply through regression to the mean. However, it is a bit disconcerting to see a general manager, who seemed to be doing everything right, rely on a 92-loss team to transform into a playoff contender in order to save his job.